Sample Scenario — Natural Disaster & Physical Disruption Simulation

The Seabrook Hurricane Exercise

A branching, choose-your-path tabletop built for a card payments processor on the Gulf Coast. The storm is days away and the forecast keeps moving. Six shared injects establish the threat, then the room's own decision — fail over early, or hold and harden — sends the exercise down one of two independent, fully-scripted paths. The weather doesn't care which one you pick.

16injects per path
2diverging paths
10 dayssimulated timeline
3.5 hrstypical runtime

Fictional, but built to feel real in the room.

Every detail below is fictional — specific enough to feel real in the room, and generic enough to map onto almost any organization whose people, facilities, and critical services sit in the same path.

Seabrook Payment Systems

A card payments processor headquartered in Tampa, Florida, processing debit and credit transactions for 14,000 merchants and 60 community banks and credit unions across the Southeast. ~2,200 employees, 1,100 of them on the Tampa campus, which also houses the primary data center. A secondary data center in Charlotte is designed to take over if Tampa goes down.

Seabrook's clients don't think about it until it stops working. When a debit card is declined at a grocery store before a storm, nobody blames the bank — they blame the moment. Seabrook's job is to make sure the moment never comes, even when its own building is in the cone.

Coastline Federal Credit Union — largest card-issuing client, 410,000 cardholders
Gulfway Markets — regional grocery chain, 180 stores
Charlotte data center — secondary site, last full failover 14 months ago
The ride-out team — 60 staff rostered to shelter on site

The crisis everyone faces.

Six injects, delivered over the first 46 hours, that every player experiences regardless of what the room ultimately decides. This phase ends with the decision that splits the exercise in two.

DAY −4
10:00
INJECT 1Detection

The cone moves north

Forecasters upgrade Tropical Storm Delphine to a hurricane. The projected track now includes Tampa Bay, with landfall roughly 96 hours out and rapid strengthening possible. The crisis management plan says to activate at a hurricane watch. There's no watch yet.

Tests: whether the plan's trigger language helps or hinders — and who has the authority to activate early on judgment alone.
16:00
INJECT 2People

The plan assumes people will show up

HR runs the numbers: 40% of Tampa staff live in mandatory-evacuation zones. The ride-out roster lists 60 names; 22 of them live in Zone A, and several have already said they'll be evacuating their families.

Tests: whether staffing plans reflect where employees actually live — and what the company owes people it's asking to stay.
DAY −3
09:00
INJECT 3Recovery capability

The site that's supposed to take over

IT reports that the last full failover to Charlotte was 14 months ago and ran at 60% of normal capacity. Two systems added since — including the new settlement engine — have never been tested there.

Tests: the gap between documented recovery capability and demonstrated recovery capability.
14:00
INJECT 4Clients

Every client wants the same promise

Coastline Federal Credit Union and Gulfway Markets both ask for written assurance that card processing will be uninterrupted. Landfall is projected for the 2nd of the month — the day before monthly benefit deposits hit and transaction volume peaks.

Tests: client communications when the honest answer is "probably, and here's our plan" rather than "yes."
18:00
INJECT 5Third parties

Your vendors have their own priorities

The telecom carrier warns that one of Tampa's two fiber routes runs through a flood zone. The generator fuel supplier says it can't guarantee refueling after landfall — hospitals and emergency services come first under its contracts.

Tests: dependency on third parties whose priorities in a regional disaster are not your priorities.
DAY −2
08:00
INJECT 6Decision point

Fail over now, or hold and harden

Delphine is forecast to make landfall as a Category 4 about 30 miles south of Tampa, but the track uncertainty is still 60 miles either side. A planned failover to Charlotte needs an 18-hour cutover window and moving 140 people. County officials have just ordered Zone A evacuated. The window to fail over in an orderly way closes tonight. The room has to decide.

Tests: decision-making on a forecast — committing cost and risk now against an outcome that may never arrive. This is the fork.

The room decides. The exercise branches.

INJECTS 1–6 DECISION A — FAIL OVER NOW B — HOLD & HARDEN

From here, the facilitator runs one of two fully independent scripts depending on what the room chose in Inject 6. Toggle between them below to see how each one unfolds — in a live session, players only ever see the one they earned.

Path A — the room fails over earlyTen injects. Failing over early buys control, not certainty — and the first outage of the event is one Seabrook causes itself.
DAY −2
20:00
INJECT 7ACutover

The untested system fails first

The cutover to Charlotte begins on schedule. Authorizations move cleanly, but the new settlement engine fails to start in Charlotte. Settlement files for 60 bank clients begin to queue.

Tests: executing a recovery plan that includes a component nobody has ever recovered.
DAY −1
07:00
INJECT 8APeople

Thirty-one people stayed home

Of the 140 staff asked to relocate to Charlotte, 31 decline — they won't leave their families ahead of a Category 4. The relocated team is working out of a hotel ballroom, and nobody has decided how their hours, lodging, or overtime will be paid.

Tests: duty of care for relocated staff, and running critical operations with a team that's smaller than the plan assumed.
11:30
INJECT 9AClients

Declined at the register

Running at reduced capacity, Charlotte pushes the decline rate at Gulfway Markets to 4% during the pre-storm shopping rush. Photos of "card not working" signs spread on social media, tagged with the grocery chain's name.

Tests: owning a self-inflicted service degradation — publicly, and with a client whose brand is taking the hit.
DAY 0
06:00
INJECT 10ALandfall

The storm turns

Delphine wobbles south overnight and makes landfall 70 miles from Tampa. The campus sees tropical-storm-force winds and some flooding, but no structural damage. By noon, a client's CFO is telling peers that Seabrook "panicked."

Tests: defending a sound decision that didn't turn out to be necessary — and separating decision quality from outcome.
DAY 1
09:00
INJECT 11AFailback

Everyone wants to go home

Business leaders want to fail back to Tampa immediately to restore full capacity. IT warns that failback has never been rehearsed and carries more risk than the failover did.

Tests: recovery sequencing — whether pressure to return to normal overrides the people who know where the risk is.
DAY 2
10:00
INJECT 12AEmployees

Some homes are gone

Most relocated staff are cleared to return, but 23 employees from the southern counties — including four from the Charlotte team — have homes with significant flood damage. Others still have no power and no way to know when it's coming back.

Tests: employee assistance after the operational crisis ends, and before anyone has asked for it.
DAY 3
14:00
INJECT 13ARegulatory

Your client's regulator wants answers

Several bank clients are asked by their own examiners to report on the service degradation. They need a root-cause summary from Seabrook within 48 hours, written for a regulator to read.

Tests: incident reporting that holds up when it's read by someone else's supervisor.
DAY 4
11:00
INJECT 14ACost

Who pays for being ready?

Relocation and cutover cost $6.8M. The insurer's position is that business interruption coverage requires physical damage at the insured site — and there wasn't any. The CFO and COO disagree openly about whether the decision was worth it.

Tests: knowing your insurance in advance, and whether leadership can hold a shared view of a decision after the bill arrives.
DAY 5
09:00
INJECT 15ADecision point

A second storm

A new system forming in the Gulf has a seven-day track that again includes Tampa. Seabrook is partially failed back. The room must decide whether to complete failback now, stay split across both sites, or move everything back to Charlotte and wait.

Tests: whether the room learned from the first decision — or decides the second one based on how the first one felt.
DAY 6
10:00
INJECT 16ARemediation

The fix is nine months long

The post-incident review finds that the settlement engine was deployed with a single-site architecture. Making it recoverable will take an estimated nine months and a budget no one has approved.

Tests: separating the relief of a storm that missed from the remediation the near-miss revealed.
Path B — the room holds and hardensTen injects. Holding buys flexibility, not safety — and once the window closes, the only failover left is an unplanned one.
DAY −2
18:00
INJECT 7BRide-out

The roster shrinks

The ride-out team reports to campus. Fourteen of the 60 rostered staff don't come — they're evacuating their families. The remaining 46 are told to expect at least 72 hours on site.

Tests: whether the response can run on the people who actually show up, not the people on the list.
DAY −1
05:00
INJECT 8BForecast

The window closes

Overnight, Delphine strengthens and the track shifts north — directly toward Tampa Bay. There are no longer 18 hours to complete an orderly failover before tropical-storm-force winds arrive.

Tests: decision regret under time pressure — and whether anyone reopens the decision while there's still a choice left.
DAY 0
02:30
INJECT 9BLandfall

On generator power

Delphine makes landfall as a Category 4. Commercial power fails across the campus and the generators take the load. Storm surge floods the lower level of the parking structure, where fuel deliveries are staged.

Tests: facility resilience under real conditions — power, fuel, water, and access.
07:15
INJECT 10BOutage

The unplanned failover

Debris cuts the second fiber route, isolating the Tampa data center. An emergency failover to Charlotte begins without a cutover window. Card processing is down for three hours on the morning benefit deposits land.

Tests: executing a crash failover — and who has the authority to call it in the middle of the storm.
DAY 1
08:00
INJECT 11BPeople

Thirty-six hours on shift

The ride-out team has been working for 36 hours. One engineer is injured clearing debris from a generator intake. Roads are closed, and relief staff can't reach the campus.

Tests: duty of care for the people who stayed — fatigue, injury, and how and when they get relieved.
13:00
INJECT 12BCommunity

Cash only, and no cash

In the storm zone, Coastline cardholders can't use debit cards at the few open stores, gas stations, and pharmacies. Local TV reports residents unable to buy essentials. The credit union's CEO calls Seabrook's CEO directly.

Tests: communications when your outage becomes a community hardship — and the client relationship that hinges on the next call.
DAY 2
10:00
INJECT 13BAccountability

One hundred and eighty people unaccounted for

Seabrook still can't reach 180 Tampa employees. The emergency notification system depends on cell networks that are mostly down, and HR is working from home addresses that may no longer be habitable.

Tests: employee accountability when the tools assume infrastructure that isn't there.
DAY 3
15:00
INJECT 14BClients

"Why didn't you fail over?"

Coastline Federal Credit Union's general counsel sends a formal letter asking why Seabrook didn't fail over before landfall, and requests the decision record from Day −2 under the contract's audit clause.

Tests: defending a judgment call with contemporaneous documentation — or discovering there isn't any.
DAY 4
09:00
INJECT 15BDecision point

Damaged in Tampa, constrained in Charlotte

The Tampa facility has water damage and can't safely return to service for at least three weeks. Charlotte is carrying the full load at 60% capacity. The room must decide how to shed load — which clients and transaction types get priority until capacity is restored.

Tests: making explicit prioritization decisions that some clients will experience as being chosen last.
DAY 6
10:00
INJECT 16BRecovery

Systems up, operations not

All services are running from Charlotte, but chargebacks, exception handling, and settlement reconciliation for three days of disrupted transactions will take two more weeks. The insurance adjuster can't reach the campus until Day 9.

Tests: the gap between technical recovery and operational recovery — and reporting it honestly upward.

What the debrief surfaces.

The two paths are built to converge on the same hard questions, arrived at from opposite directions.

If the room failed over early

  • Was the failover decision based on a documented trigger, or on how the forecast felt that morning — and would the room make it the same way again?
  • Why did a critical system reach production without being recoverable at the secondary site?
  • Did anyone know before the event what the insurance policy would and wouldn't cover?

If the room held and hardened

  • Was there a point when the decision to hold should have been revisited — and who was watching for it?
  • Did the ride-out plan reflect where staff actually live and what they'd do with their own families?
  • How did the team account for employees once the systems it relied on were down?
Seabrook Payment Systems, Hurricane Delphine, and all named clients in this scenario are fictional and created for exercise purposes only.

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This is one scenario. Yours would be built around your business.

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